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Commentators have long noted that the Federal Circuit 
tends to produce formalistic patent doctrine that favors 
bright-line rules over extensive engagement with facts and 
context. This Article, however, argues that Chief Judge 
Rader’s approach to patent law diverges sharply from this 
methodological tendency. In particular, it explores Chief 
Judge Rader’s rejection of formalism by examining his 
contributions to three areas of patent doctrine: claim 
construction, patentable subject matter, and the written 
description requirement. Throughout his engagement with 
patent law, Chief Judge Rader exhibits a striking sensitivity 
to context, policy considerations, and exogenous sources of 
authority that distinguishes himself from his more 
formalistic colleagues. The Article concludes with a brief 
normative assessment of Chief Judge Rader’s 









                                                                                                         
* Professor of Law, UC Davis School of Law. Thanks to Professor Robert 
Gomulkiewicz for comments on an earlier draft of this piece. 
1
Lee: Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
406 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
Introduction   .............................................................................. 406
I. Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Doctrine   ............... 407
II. Antiformalism in the Jurisprudence of Chief Judge  
Rader   ................................................................................. 412
A. Appellate Review of Claim Construction   ....................... 412
B. Patentable Subject Matter   .............................................. 415
C. The Written Description Requirement  ............................ 419
III. Assessing a Methodological Contrarian   .............................. 423




Individuals and the organizations to which they belong 
sometimes display remarkably different characteristics. While the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has long been 
characterized as producing formalistic patent doctrine,1
                                                                                                         
1 See, e.g., Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in 
Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1 
(2003); Peter Lee, Patent Law and The Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010) 
[hereinafter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures]; Arti K. Rai, Engaging 
Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 1035 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal 
Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 776 (2003). This is not to suggest, of course, 
that members of the Federal Circuit are homogenous in their methodological 
preferences. Cf. R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit 
Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1105, 1159-63 (2004) (situating Federal Circuit judges on a “procedural” 
versus “holistic” continuum regarding their approach to claim construction). 
Furthermore, this characterization of Federal Circuit jurisprudence as formalistic 
has not gone uncontested. See Tun-Jen Chiang, Formalism, Realism, and Patent 
Scope, 1 IP THEORY 88 (2010) (arguing that claim scope doctrine appearing to 
be formalistic on its surface is actually quite flexible and indeterminate). 
 this Article 
contends that its Chief Judge does not share those tendencies. Just 
as parts sometimes differ from the whole, this Article departs from 
the others in this collection by focusing on Chief Judge Rader’s 
methodological orientation rather than his specific doctrinal 
contributions to intellectual property law (though the two, of 
course, are intimately intertwined). It argues that, contrary to the 
2
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general orientation of the Federal Circuit, the patent jurisprudence 
of Chief Judge Rader reflects a striking rejection of formalism and 
a concomitant embrace of holism, realism, and context.2
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explores the widely 
held conception that the Federal Circuit produces formalistic patent 
doctrine. It further explores the nature and meaning of formalism 
and its many methodological opposites. Part II examines Chief 
Judge Rader’s rejection of formalism by considering his 
jurisprudence across three areas of patent doctrine: claim 
construction, patentable subject matter, and the written description 
requirement. Throughout his engagement with patent law, Chief 
Judge Rader exhibits a sensitivity to context and exogenous 
sources of authority that distinguishes his jurisprudence from 
traditionally formalistic Federal Circuit doctrine. Part III provides 
a brief normative assessment of Chief Judge Rader’s contrarian 
methodology and its value to patent law. 
   
 
I. FORMALISM AND ANTIFORMALISM IN PATENT DOCTRINE 
 
Federal Circuit patent doctrine has long been characterized as 
formalistic.3 Formalism, of course, is subject to a wide variety of 
definitions and connotations, and it can operate at many levels of 
judicial decision making.4 To begin, the Federal Circuit often 
creates substantive patent doctrine that is highly formalistic. In this 
context, by formalism I am referring to the court’s emphasis on 
deciding cases “according to rule.”5
                                                                                                         
2 Throughout this Article, I will refer to Judge Rader as “Chief Judge” to 
reflect his current title, which he assumed on June 1, 2010. 
 In articulating new patent 
3 See supra note 1. 
4 See generally Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: 
Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 530, 531 (1999); Duncan 
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1685 (1976); Frank I. Michelman, A Brief Anatomy of Adjudicative Rule-
Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 934 (1999); Richard H. Pildes, Forms of 
Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1999); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 
YALE L.J. 509 (1988). 
5 Schauer, supra note 4, at 510. These rules may be articulated in statute, 
and one conception of formalism refers to a mode of statutory interpretation that 
elevates textual fidelity over legislative intent and contextual factors. In general, 
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doctrine, the Federal Circuit routinely favors bright-line rules over 
discretionary standards.6 Such doctrine tends to eschew “totality of 
the circumstances” tests that admit numerous contextual factors.7 
Accordingly, formalistic frameworks tend to unfold according to 
an internal logic whereby syllogism takes precedent over realism 
and context.8 Such attributes characterize a significant proportion 
of Federal Circuit patent doctrine, and there is evidence that it has 
become more formalistic over time.9 In addition, the Federal 
Circuit tends to be formalistic not only in the substantive doctrine 
that it produces, but in its reasoning as well. Unlike many other 
appellate courts, the Federal Circuit rarely ventures beyond 
traditional legal authorities to cite empirical and economic 
scholarship10 or international law to support its decisions. 
Furthermore, the court rarely offers policy rationales for the 
doctrine that it produces.11
Federal Circuit formalism is evident in a number of doctrinal 
  
                                                                                                         
I use formalism in a broader sense to refer to rule-based adjudication, including 
instances where rules arise from judge-made rather than statutory law. 
6 See Thomas, supra note 1, at 776 (noting that Federal Circuit doctrine 
reflects “adjudicative rule formalism”). 
7 See Schauer, supra note 4, at 510 (“[F]ormalism screen[s] off from a 
decisionmaker factors that a sensitive decisionmaker would otherwise take into 
account.”).  
8 This inward orientation is illustrated, for example, in the Federal Circuit’s 
approach to claim construction, which prioritizes intrinsic evidence (such as the 
text of the claims themselves, the specification, and prosecution history) over 
extrinsic evidence (such as expert testimony, dictionaries, and other outside 
sources) as interpretive aids. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc); Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1, 
at 29-33. 
9 Thomas, supra note 1, at 773. 
10 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing 
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 780-81 (2004); 
Craig Allen Nard, Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of 
Scholarship in Federal Circuit Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 
667, 678-83 (2002). 
11 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, What the Federal Circuit Can Learn from 
the Supreme Court – And Vice Versa, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 787, 804-05 (2010) 
(“[A]lthough the Federal Circuit routinely recites policy justifications for the 
statutory requirements of patent law, it rarely provides insight into the policy 
rationale for its own decisions.”). 
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areas.12 For example, at one point the court adopted a highly 
formalistic approach to prosecution history estoppel, an important 
doctrine that constrains patentees’ assertion of infringement under 
the doctrine of equivalents. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku 
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 
adopted a complete bar approach to prosecution history estoppel.13 
Under this ruling, when a patent applicant narrows a claim element 
during prosecution, she is estopped from later asserting any 
equivalent of that element when alleging infringement under the 
doctrine of equivalents. As judges and commentators have 
recognized, this is a highly formalistic, bright-line rule.14 This rule 
“truncates” judicial inquiries because courts need not consider 
whether any technological equivalents survive the application of 
estoppel, for none does.15 Notably, the Supreme Court 
subsequently reversed the Federal Circuit and established a flexible 
bar approach to prosecution history estoppel in which contextual 
factors may allow a patentee to assert equivalents to a claim 
element even when prosecution history estoppel applies.16
The Federal Circuit’s formalistic tendencies are further 
reflected in its historical approach to nonobviousness. In a series of 
cases, the court developed the so-called teaching, suggestion, or 




                                                                                                         
12 I explore these doctrinal examples at greater length in Lee, Patent Law 
and the Two Cultures, supra note 
 Under the TSM test, an 
invention is only considered obvious if there was some discernible 
1. 
13 234 F.3d 558 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
14 See id. at 620 (Linn, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(characterizing the majority’s decision as creating a “new rigid bright line 
rule”); Holbrook, supra note 1, at 5; Thomas, supra note 1, at 783-86. 
15 While Festo represents a formalistic decision in that it creates a bright-
line rule, it is antiformalistic to the extent that it reflects engagement with policy 
considerations and the working details of the patent system. Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit adopted this bright-line rule precisely because the flexible bar proved 
unworkable in practice. As this case illustrates, characterizing a decision as 
formalistic can be rather complicated, as the rule articulated and its justification 
may have differing methodological orientations. 
16 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 
722 (2002). 
17 See, e.g., In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
5
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teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine its constituent 
elements.18 As I have argued elsewhere, the TSM test represents a 
doctrinal attempt to impose a rule-like framework around an 
intrinsically nebulous, holistic nonobviousness inquiry.19
Finally, one sees the Federal Circuit’s formalistic tendencies in 
the law of patent infringement remedies. In MercExchange, L.L.C. 
v. eBay, Inc., the Federal Circuit adopted a “general rule” of 
virtually automatically granting an injunction after a finding of 
patent infringement.
  
20 Among other implications, this syllogistic 
rule (“if infringement, then injunction”) allowed courts to largely 
ignore factors such as the nature of a patented invention, its status 
as a component in a broader product, and the business practices of 
the patentee in determining the appropriateness of injunctive 
relief.21
In these disparate doctrinal areas, one sees a variety of distinct 
but related dimensions of formalism. Formalistic doctrine 
establishes bright-line rules that decrease engagement with facts. 
Relatedly, formalistic reasoning prioritizes internal consistency 
over sensitivity to external context. As I define formalism and its 
connotations rather broadly, it necessarily has a wide range of 
opposites. In laying the foundation for exploring Chief Judge 
Rader’s “antiformalist” jurisprudence, it is helpful to examine the 
many connotations of that term.  
 Here again, the Federal Circuit’s formalistic rule tended to 
reduce contextual consideration and truncate legal inquiries.  
                                                                                                         
18 R. Polk Wagner & Katherine J. Strandburg, Debate, The Obviousness 
Requirement in Patent Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 96, 98 (2006), 
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/Wagner_Strandburg_Debate.pdf 
(exploring doctrinal nuances and controversies related to the TSM test). 
19 See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1, at 35-39. In 
similar fashion, the Federal Circuit has also diminished the technological 
demands of nonobviousness inquiries by elevating the importance of non-
technological “secondary considerations,” such as the commercial success of an 
invention, within nonobviousness determinations. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, 
Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885, 893 (2004). 
20 401 F.3d. 1323, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (articulating a “general rule . . . 
that a permanent injunction will issue once infringement and validity have been 
adjudged”) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1246-47 
(Fed. Cir. 1989)). 
21 See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1, at 40. 
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First, antiformalist doctrine is attentive to facts and context. In 
establishing substantive rules of decision, it favors flexible 
standards rather than inquiry-truncating rules. Antiformalist 
doctrine, moreover, may be holistic not only in its substantive 
content, but also in its genesis and justification. Antiformalist 
doctrine thus is “realist” to the extent that it responds to the real-
world technical, institutional, and economic context in which 
patent law unfolds. 
Second, antiformalist doctrine tends to be more explicitly 
focused on outcomes and policy objectives.22
Finally, related to the notion of context, antiformalist reasoning 
looks beyond traditional legal authorities, such as binding statutes 
and precedent, when crafting new doctrine. In particular, 
antiformalist jurisprudence is more likely to consult empirical and 
 Formalistic 
reasoning typically unfolds according to an internal logic in which 
decision makers systematically apply unwavering rules to reach 
legal conclusions. It thereby has a syllogistic character in which 
legal opinions proceed as deductive proofs. Antiformalist 
reasoning, however, is more attentive to outcomes and is mindful 
of shaping legal rules to produce desirable results. This “big-
picture” orientation helps render antiformalist jurisprudence more 
explicitly sensitive to policy considerations. 
                                                                                                         
22 One must tread carefully here, for formalism may also advance important 
policy objectives. In particular, formalism may (but does not always) produce 
more certain and determinate outcomes to legal disputes, see Schauer, supra 
note 4, at 539, which is especially beneficial to motivating and safeguarding 
investments in technological innovation. Furthermore, formalism reduces 
cognitive burdens on decision makers, a particularly important consideration 
when lay judges are charged with engaging and understanding unfamiliar 
technologies. See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1. By 
characterizing antiformalist jurisprudence as more explicitly policy oriented, I 
am referring to antiformalist courts’ greater willingness to interpret and craft 
doctrine in light of the overarching constitutional objective “[t]o promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Several other 
commentators have also noted a disconnect between the Federal Circuit’s rule-
based formalism and the overarching policy objective of promoting innovation. 
See, e.g., Rai, supra note 1, at 1040; Thomas, supra note 1, at 799; cf. Tun-Jen 
Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. 
REV. 1353, 1402 (noting that “the policy goal of the patent system is a standard” 
rather than a rule) [hereinafter Chiang, Rules and Standards].   
7
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academic studies to buttress legal conclusions. Additionally, it is 
more likely to consider foreign and international law for guidance 
when shaping domestic doctrine. Antiformalism thus has several 
dimensions, many of which are on display in the patent 
jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader. The following Part explores 
these antiformalist characteristics in Chief Judge Rader’s 
contributions to three doctrinal areas: claim construction, 
patentable subject matter, and the written description requirement. 
 
II. ANTIFORMALISM IN THE JURISPRUDENCE  
OF CHIEF JUDGE RADER 
 
A.  Appellate Review of Claim Construction 
 
First, Chief Judge Rader’s sensitivity to context and realism is 
evident in his approach to claim construction. Claim 
construction—the process by which courts construe the meaning of 
claim terms—often determines the outcome of patent litigation.23 
Partly because of its substantive importance, claim construction 
has been a highly controversial issue at the Federal Circuit. Claim 
construction has spawned several related debates, many of them 
centering on the role of various institutions in interpreting claims.24 
A particularly important issue is the appropriate standard of review 
of claim construction on appeal.25 On the one hand, the Supreme 
Court has held that judges rather than juries should construe 
claims,26
                                                                                                         
23 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 205 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting); 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
(Newman, J., dissenting), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996); Kimberly A. Moore, Are 
District Judges Equipped To Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 8 
(2001). 
 suggesting to some that claim construction is a legal issue 
24 See, e.g., Markman, 52 F.3d at 979, aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996) (holding 
that judges rather than juries should construe claims); Phillips v. AWH Corp. 
415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (holding that courts should give 
greater weight to intrinsic versus extrinsic evidence in construing claims). 
25 See Jeffrey A. Leftsin, Claim Construction, Appeal, and the Predictability 
of Interpretative Regimes, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1033, 1033-34 (2007). 
26 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
8
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that should be reviewed de novo.27 On the other hand, claim 
construction involves many factual findings on the part of trial 
courts, which suggests a more deferential standard of appellate 
review.28 In Cybor v. FAS, the Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, 
attempted to resolve this dispute by holding that claim construction 
is a question of law to be reviewed de novo on appeal.29
Chief Judge Rader concurred in the judgment but dissented 
vigorously from the court’s pronouncements on claim construction. 
While recognizing that the standard of review of claim 
construction “seems an esoteric legal topic,”
  
30 Chief Judge Rader’s 
concurrence nevertheless appreciates its immense practical 
significance.31 Furthermore, his concurrence pierces the sophist 
reasoning underlying the majority’s opinion that appellate courts 
should review claim construction without deference. The majority 
reasoned that trial courts may utilize expert testimony to 
understand, but not interpret, claim terms, thus affording them no 
institutional advantage relative to appellate courts (which, of 
course, may not consult experts outside of the record). Chief Judge 
Rader, however, argues that this distinction lacks merit, for a trial 
judge’s ability to consult experts to understand claim terms would 
undoubtedly inform her interpretation of those terms.32 In a 
broader sense, Chief Judge Rader significantly engages the 
realities of trial and appellate adjudication, in which trial judges 
may liberally consult outside information that appellate judges may 
not.33
Along similar lines, Chief Judge Rader’s concurrence 
meaningfully engages the working details of patent adjudication. 
He argues that deference to trial court claim construction would 
fulfill the promise of early certainty in patent litigation, which was 
 In his view, these institutional advantages render trial court 
claim constructions more worthy of deference on appeal. 
                                                                                                         
27 See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (en banc). 
28 Id. at 1478 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment). 
29 See id. at 1451. 
30 Id. at 1474 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment). 
31 Id.  
32 Id.  
33 Id.  at 1477 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment). 
9
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a primary objective of allocating claim construction to judges 
rather than juries.34 In a decidedly antiformalist move, he marshals 
empirical evidence to support his arguments, citing the Federal 
Circuit’s general reversal rate of district courts as well as a study 
revealing a 40 percent reversal rate (in whole or in part) of claim 
constructions since Markman.35 Such engagement with context, 
particularly empirical studies, diverges sharply from the Federal 
Circuit’s traditional formalistic tendencies. Mindful of the realities 
of patent litigation, he argues that de novo review of claim 
construction discourages parties from settling, as there is a 
significant chance that the Federal Circuit will reverse a claim 
construction on appeal.36
In a further antiformalist move, Chief Judge Rader advocates a 
“functional approach” to establishing a proper standard of review 
for claim construction.
 Explicitly invoking policy 
considerations, Chief Judge Rader argues that deference to district 
court claim construction would increase the efficiency and 
decrease the cost and duration of patent litigation. 
37 Just as the objective of adjudicative 
economy informed the allocation of claim construction to judges 
rather than juries, Chief Judge Rader argues that functional 
considerations should help allocate decisional power between trial 
and appellate courts.38 He reiterates these functional arguments in 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., a subsequent case 
involving the standard of review of claim construction.39
                                                                                                         
34 Id. at 1475-76. Here, Chief Judge Rader refers to an earlier line of 
precedent, culminating in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 
(1996), holding that judges rather than juries should perform claim construction. 
This decision spawned the emergence of Markman hearings in which judges, 
prior to the start of trial, construe claims. In theory, Markman hearings establish 
early certainty around claim terms in patent litigation, a model upset by de novo 
review of claim construction on appeal. See Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of 
Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 32 (2000) [hereinafter Nard, 
Claim Interpretation]. 
 Again 
engaging in institutional competence analysis, Chief Judge Rader 
35 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1476 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment). 
36 Id.; see Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 34, at 33. 
37 Cybor, 138 F.3d at 1477 (Rader, J., concurring in the judgment).  
38 See Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 34, at 32. 
39 469 F.3d 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from the 
denial of the petition for rehearing en banc). 
10
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argues that district courts, which are closer to the facts of a case, 
are better situated than appellate judges to construe technical 
patent claims.40 Reflecting an antiformalist orientation, Chief 
Judge Rader consistently draws on policy, function, and 
pragmatism, as well as a deep understanding of institutional 




B.  Patentable Subject Matter 
 
Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist tendencies are also reflected 
in his views on patentable subject matter. In In re Bilski, the 
Federal Circuit, sitting en banc, considered the patentability of a 
method for hedging risks in commodities trading.42 More broadly, 
this case presented the court with an opportunity to clarify the 
distinctions between patent-eligible processes and those that are 
not eligible for patenting.43
                                                                                                         
40 Id. at 1044. 
 In the majority opinion, then-Chief 
Judge Michel articulated the machine-or-transformation test to 
govern the patentability of processes. Under this test, a process was 
eligible for patenting only if “(1) it is tied to a particular machine 
or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different 
41 Notably, Chief Judge Rader’s holistic tendencies apply not only to his 
preferred standard of review for claim construction on appeal, but to his 
preferred methodology for interpreting claims themselves. While Phillips v. 
AWH establishes an interpretative framework that privileges intrinsic over 
extrinsic evidence, Chief Judge Rader has been characterized as a “pragmatic 
textualist” who seeks greater engagement with context to understand and 
interpret claims. Nard, Claim Interpretation, supra note 34, at 10-11; see 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 114 F.3d 1547, 1555 (Fed. 
Cir. 1997) (“[T]he testimony of one skilled in the art about the meaning of claim 
terms at the time of the invention will almost always qualify as relevant 
evidence.”) (Rader, J.), abrogated on other grounds by Cybor, 138 F.3d at 
1456); see also Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and 
Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 340 (2007) (“A formalist 
approach strictly limits the universe of permissible interpretative sources.”). 
42 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 
130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
43 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (listing “process[es]” as a statutorily 
recognized category of patentable subject matter). 
11
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state or thing.”44 This is a relatively formalistic test, as it strives to 
reduce a rather nebulous inquiry—the patentability of processes—
to two governing rules.45 Applying this test, the Federal Circuit 
denied the patentability of the subject invention.46
Chief Judge Rader agreed that the invention at issue did not 
comprise patentable subject matter, but he offered a very different 
rationale. In its overall tone, Chief Judge Rader’s dissent is 
sensitive to context; he takes the majority to task for adopting a 
patent-eligibility framework better suited to “the age of iron and 
steel” rather than the current era of “subatomic particles and 
terabytes.”
 
47 In rejecting the machine-or-transformation test as the 
sole test of process patentability, Chief Judge Rader turns instead 
to longstanding precedent that natural laws, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas are not patentable subject matter.48 Relying on 
this case law, Chief Judge Rader argues that the patent applicants’ 
method of hedging risk is nothing more than an unpatentable 
abstract idea.49
In addition to representing a different (and perhaps doctrinally 
sounder) basis for denying patentability relative to the machine-or-
transformation test, the abstract idea test is inherently more 
holistic.
 
50 Whether or not a discovery comprises an abstract idea is 
a complicated inquiry encompassing several considerations. 
Abstract ideas represent “the basic tools of scientific and 
technological work.”51
                                                                                                         
44 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954, 956.  
 As such, characterizing an invention as an 
45 The Federal Circuit has been formalistic in other articulations of 
patentable subject matter as well. See, e.g., State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998) 
(articulating a rule that patentable subject matter comprises any process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter that produces “a useful, 
concrete and tangible result”); see also Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 
supra note 1, at 61 n.354. 
46 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 949. 
47 Id. at 1011 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
48 Id.; see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980); Diamond v. 
Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981). 
49 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
50 Cf. Chiang, Rules and Standards, supra note 22, at 1356 (“This ‘abstract-
idea’ doctrine is not capable of bright-line rules.”). 
51 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
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abstract idea may require determining whether that asset helps to 
facilitate broader, industry-wide developments and technological 
progress.52 An analogy can be drawn to another line-drawing 
mechanism in intellectual property law: the idea-expression 
dichotomy in copyright.53 In that context, separating protectable 
expression from nonprotectable idea often proceeds as a policy 
determination inquiring into whether an asset is so abstract that 
subjecting it to exclusive rights would effectively impair rather 
than advance creative progress.54 This instrumentalist orientation 
also informs identifying “abstract ideas” in patent law and 
manifests itself in Chief Judge Rader’s Bilski dissent.55 
Emphasizing the patent system’s overarching utilitarian objectives, 
Chief Judge Rader urges the Federal Circuit to “ask whether its 
decisions incentivize research for cures and other important 
technical advances.”56 Notably, while Chief Judge Rader dissented 
from the majority’s opinion, he received at least partial vindication 
at the Supreme Court. On appeal, the Court rejected the machine-
or-transformation test as the sole test of process patentability and 
held the applicants’ invention unpatentable as an abstract idea.57
In addition to emphasizing context, Chief Judge Rader’s 
patentable subject matter jurisprudence exhibits another 
 
                                                                                                         
52 Cf. Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1339 
(2011) (arguing that courts should consider the “generative nature of the new 
technology” when assessing whether it comprises an abstract idea). 
53 See Peter Lee, The Evolution of Intellectual Infrastructure, 83 WASH. L. 
REV. 39, 80 (2008). 
54 Id.; see Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 
(9th Cir. 1971) (“We think the production of jeweled bee pins is a larger private 
preserve than Congress intended to be set aside in the public market without a 
patent. A jeweled bee pin is therefore an ‘idea’ that defendants were free to 
copy.”) (emphasis added). 
55 However, while policy considerations may shed light on identifying 
abstract ideas, Chief Judge Rader remains sensitive to the line-drawing 
difficulties of this doctrine. See Research Corp. Technologies v. Microsoft 
Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 868 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[T]his court also will not presume to 
define ‘abstract’ beyond the recognition that this disqualifying characteristic 
should exhibit itself so manifestly as to override the broad statutory categories of 
eligible subject matter . . . .”). 
56 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1014 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
57 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
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antiformalist trait: engagement with foreign and international 
patent law. In his Bilski dissent, Chief Judge Rader notes that the 
European Patent Convention constrains patentable subject matter 
more than its U.S. counterpart by restricting software and other 
method patents and by prohibiting patents deemed contrary to the 
public interest.58 He disfavors such restrictions, and he argues that 
the United States’ more expansive conception of patentable subject 
matter has contributed to this country’s world leadership in 
innovation.59
Such engagement with realism and comparative insights is also 
reflected in his “additional views” filed in Classen 
Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen Idec.
 These comparative considerations broaden the scope 
of patent-eligibility analysis beyond traditional legal authorities 
and reveal macro-level insights and policy objectives that can 
guide unsettled doctrine.  
60 In this case, which 
addressed the patentability of methods for evaluating the safety of 
immunization schedules, Chief Judge Rader begins by observing 
that many well-meaning attempts to constrain patentable subject 
matter have merely encouraged novel claim drafting to evade such 
constraints.61 For example, prohibitions against patenting 
mathematical algorithms62 simply led patent applicants to claim 
software inventions not as disembodied processes but as “computer 
programs embodied in a tangible medium.”63 Reflecting his realist 
orientation, he notes that “[w]hen careful claim drafting or new 
claim formats avoid eligibility restrictions, the doctrine becomes 
very hollow.”64
As in his Bilski dissent, he punctuates his arguments by 
referencing foreign experience. He argues that the “real-world 
impact” of subject matter restrictions is to “frustrate innovation 
 As Chief Judge Rader recognizes, attempts to 
impose precise rules on patentable subject matter are vulnerable to 
gaming by strategic behavior.  
                                                                                                         
58 Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
59 Id.  
60 659 F.3d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
61 Id. at 1074 (Rader, J., additional views). 
62 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71-73 (1972). 
63 In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
64 Classen, 659 F.3d at 1074 (Rader, J., additional views). 
14
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/7
2012] ANTIFORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 419 
and drive research funding to more hospitable locations.”65 He 
cites the European Patent Convention’s limitations on patentable 
subject matter in the biotechnological realm, arguing that such 
constraints helped shift innovative activity to the United States.66 
Here as well, a policy-oriented view of the patent system informed 
by comparative insights undergirds Chief Judge Rader’s defense of 
expansive patentable subject matter.67
 
 
C.  The Written Description Requirement 
 
Finally, antiformalist characteristics are also evident in Chief 
Judge Rader’s approach to the written description requirement. To 
understand Chief Judge Rader’s position and reasoning, some 
context is in order. The patent statute contains several provisions 
defining the disclosure requirements for obtaining a patent. In 
particular, 35 U.S.C. § 112 states:  
The specification shall contain a written description 
of the invention, and of the manner and process of 
making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly 
connected, to make and use the same, and shall set 
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of 
carrying out his invention.68
This statutory language has always been understood to create an 
“enablement” requirement whereby a patent disclosure must teach 
an ordinary artisan how to make and use a claimed invention. 
Courts and commentators have long debated, however, whether 
 
                                                                                                         
65 Id. at 1075. 
66 Id. 
67 Notably, this expansive conception of patentable subject matter parallels 
normative arguments that patent eligibility should operate as a “coarse eligibility 
filter,” leaving more finely-tuned analyses of patentability to other doctrines. See 
Research Corp. Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 627 F.3d 859, 869 (Fed. Cir. 2010); 
cf. John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 89 TEX. 
L. REV. 1041, 1065 (2011); Joshua D. Sarnoff, Patent-Eligible Inventions after 
Bilski: History and Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 106 (2011). 
68 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
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this provision also creates an independent “written description” 
requirement, whereby a patent applicant must adequately describe 
her claimed invention.69
Even if one accepts that an independent written description 
requirement exists, the exact contours of that requirement have 
also been subject to debate. Traditionally, the written description 
requirement functioned solely to police priority by ensuring that 
amended claims were supported by an original disclosure.
  
70 In this 
view, the written description requirement prevented patent 
applicants from amending claims throughout prosecution to claim 
technological subject matter that they had not described in their 
disclosure (which is generally fixed at the time of filing). However, 
in the 1997 case of Regents of the University of California v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., the Federal Circuit extended the written description 
requirement to operate as a substantive constraint on original 
claims as well.71 Many judges of the Federal Circuit, as well as 
academic commentators, were quite uneasy with this purported 
expansion.72
In a series of opinions, primarily dissents, Chief Judge Rader 
has consistently argued that the written description requirement 




                                                                                                         
69 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the 
“Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure 
Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 61 (2000) (“[T]he distinction between 
the written description and enablement requirements is artificial.”). 
 While this position is notable in and of itself, equally 
revealing is the antiformalist reasoning underlying it. Take, for 
70 See Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: 
A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the 
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 4 (2007). 
71 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
72 See, e.g., Holman, supra note 70, at 17-20; Janis, supra note 69, at 60. 
73 See, e.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en banc); Univ. 
of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307-08 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en banc); Ariad 
Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(Rader, J., dissenting-in-part and concurring-in-part); see also Holman, supra 
note 70, at 18 (“Judge Rader is probably the Federal Circuit’s most outspoken 
critic of the Lilly doctrine.”). 
16
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/7
2012] ANTIFORMALISM AT THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 421 
example, Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., a case in which 
the majority endorsed a capacious view of the written description 
requirement.74 In his dissent from the denial of the decision not to 
rehear this case en banc, Chief Judge Rader relies significantly on 
functional considerations to argue for a narrower conception of the 
written description requirement. He first observes that at the time 
of the first statutory codification of the words “written description” 
in 1793, patents did not require claims.75 As such, the written 
description (i.e., specification) played the crucial function of 
demarcating the boundaries of a patentee’s asserted property right. 
Subsequent statutory interventions, however, resulted in the 
requirement of formally claiming patented inventions. In Chief 
Judge Rader’s view, given that the claims now served to delimit 
patent scope, the only function left to the specification was not to 
“describe” the invention but to enable a person of ordinary skill in 
the art to make and use it.76
According to Chief Judge Rader, this doctrinal landscape 
changed in 1967, when the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 
a precursor to the Federal Circuit, decided In re Ruschig.
  
77 In this 
case, the C.C.P.A. “calved a new [written description] doctrine out 
of the § 112 enablement requirement” for the sole purpose of 
policing new matter in claims, i.e., claim amendments.78 Thus, the 
“origin and purpose” of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and the modern role of 
claims in delimiting patent scope reveal that the proper function of 
the written description requirement is to police priority for 
amended claims.79
In arguing for a narrow conception of the written description 
requirement, Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist reasoning 
manifests itself in another way: through extensively engaging 
 Ultimately, history and function inform Chief 
Judge Rader’s more modest conception of the written description 
requirement. 
                                                                                                         
74 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
75 Id. at 977 (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en banc). 
76 Id. 
77 54 C.C.P.A. 1551 (1967); see also Janis, supra note 69, at 59. 
78 323 F.3d at 978 (Rader, J., dissenting from decision not to hear case en 
banc); see Janis, supra note 69, at 59. 
79 Id. at 983. 
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academic scholarship.80 In his Enzo Biochem dissent, Chief Judge 
Rader cites several academic articles highlighting the novelty of 
applying the written description requirement to constrain original 
claims.81 These academic treatments lend support to his contention 
that the written description requirement should only be used to 
police priority for amended claims. Chief Judge Rader’s 
engagement with academic research assumes far greater 
proportions in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., Inc.82 
In his dissent from the decision not to hear this case en banc, he 
reiterates his arguments against extending the written description 
requirement to substantively constrain original claims.83 Here, 
however, he relies powerfully on academic commentary to support 
his views. His examination of the literature “shows 31 articles 
criticizing the Eli Lilly doctrine, 7 articles defending the doctrine, 
and 16 neutrally commenting on the state of this evolving case 
law.”84 Quite remarkably, Chief Judge Rader attaches as an 
appendix a lengthy table citing and quoting from each of these 
academic sources.85 He repeats this reliance on academic 
commentary in his partial concurrence and dissent in Ariad 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the recent en banc case 
holding that the written description requirement does indeed apply 
to both original and amended claims.86
                                                                                                         
80 Such willingness to cite scholarship is perhaps not surprising given his 
significant teaching experience and ties to academia. 
 Such engagement with 
81 323 F.3d at 982-83 (citing Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: 
Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly 
Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55 (2000), Janice M. 
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to 
Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 (1998), Arti K. Rai, 
Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827 (1999), Harold C. Wegner, An Enzo White Paper: A 
New Judicial Standard for a Biotechnology “Written Description” Under 35 
U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 1, 1 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 254 (2002)). 
82 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from decision 
not to hear case en banc). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 1309. 
85 Id. at 1314-25. 
86 598 F.3d 1336, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Rader, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (noting “the extensive academic criticism of this 
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academic literature is quite unique within Federal Circuit 
jurisprudence and reflects Chief Judge Rader’s willingness to look 
outside of traditional legal authorities to craft patent doctrine. 
 
III. ASSESSING A METHODOLOGICAL CONTRARIAN 
 
The primary aim of this Article is to describe Chief Judge 
Rader’s antiformalist orientation, which distinguishes him from the 
commonly-perceived formalistic tenor of Federal Circuit patent 
doctrine. Nevertheless, a brief normative appraisal is in order as 
well. On the one hand, antiformalist jurisprudence may temper the 
rigidity, reductionism, and indifference to context often associated 
with formalism. These critiques apply with particular force to the 
patent jurisprudence of the Federal Circuit.87 On the other hand, 
antiformalism is itself susceptible to criticism as producing 
doctrine that is indeterminate, inconsistent, and unpredictable.88 
Indeed, holistic frameworks may be particularly difficult to apply 
in the context of patent law, as they often intensify lay judges’ 
engagement with technologically challenging subject matter.89 
Such critiques may apply to Chief Judge Rader’s views; for 
example, precisely identifying an “abstract idea” for the purposes 
of determining patentable subject matter is not an easy task, and 
reasonable courts may draw different conclusions from similar 
factual predicates.90
Of course, one rough measure of judicial “success” involves 
 
                                                                                                         
product of judicial imagination”). 
87 Cf. Thomas, supra note 1, at 775 (“[A]n orientation toward rules 
threatens to make the patent law hidebound and unresponsive to changing 
conditions.”). 
88 Cf. Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Property Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 
577, 578 (1988) (distinguishing between hard-edged, crystalline legal precepts 
and “fuzzy, ambiguous” rules of decision).  
89 Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1. 
90 See Chiang, Rules and Standards, supra note 22, at 1385-86. As noted, 
Chief Judge Rader has demonstrated some sensitivity to these difficulties in 
articulating (or refusing to articulate) the contours of the abstractness doctrine. 
See supra note 55. Perhaps reflecting the difficulty of crafting patentable subject 
matter doctrine, the Supreme Court recently revisited this topic in Mayo 
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012). 
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carrying the weight of the court, and in this sense, Chief Judge 
Rader’s efforts have often not been successful. Notably, in each of 
the doctrinal areas examined—claim construction, patentable 
subject matter, and the written description requirement—Chief 
Judge Rader’s antiformalist sentiments have been expressed in 
dissent.91
Consistency with one’s colleagues, however, is only one 
measure of success, and a rather impoverished one at that. From a 
wider perspective, Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist approach to 
patent law has received some vindication at the Supreme Court, 
which has produced notably holistic doctrine in reversing several 
important lines of Federal Circuit precedent.
 Chief Judge Rader may be the exception that proves the 
rule; his engagement with holism, realism, and exogenous legal 
authorities such as foreign law and academic scholarship 
distinguishes him from his generally more formalistic colleagues.  
92 As mentioned, in 
Bilski v. Kappos, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
holding that the machine-or-transformation test represents the sole 
test for process patentability.93 Rather, it denied the patentability of 
the claimed invention by invoking the “abstract idea” line of 
doctrine, thus paralleling Chief Judge Rader’s dissent.94 It remains 
to be seen whether Chief Judge Rader’s more antiformalist mode 
of reasoning will continue to find vindication at the Supreme Court 
in other doctrinal areas as well.95
In a broader sense, just as this Article focuses more on process 
than substantive outcomes, the value of Chief Judge Rader’s 
contributions to patent law may depend more on his contrarian 
 
                                                                                                         
91 This is not always the case. The brevity of this Article precludes 
canvassing Chief Judge Rader’s antiformalist tendencies in other doctrinal areas, 
but there are instances where Chief Judge Rader’s holistic views have carried 
the court. See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (noting 
that “[t]he Supreme Court’s admonition against a formalistic approach to 
obviousness in this context actually resurrects this court’s own wisdom” from 
earlier case law). 
92 See Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, supra note 1. 
93 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). 
94 Similarly holistic, in arriving at its decision, the Supreme Court “focused 
not on semantic content but real-world commerce.” Chiang, Rules and 
Standards, supra note 22, at 1390. 
95 Cf. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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input into the work of the Federal Circuit rather than whether or 
not his views are reflected in majority opinions. The Federal 
Circuit was developed as a quasi-specialized court charged chiefly 
with unifying and imparting greater certainty to patent law.96 In 
many ways, formalism has been an important tool in this project. 
Throughout its history, however, the quasi-specialized nature of 
the Federal Circuit has produced concerns over “tunnel vision,” 
hypertechnicality, and doctrinal rigidity. There is a risk, in other 
words, that in unifying patent law, the Federal Circuit may become 
too unified itself. In this sense, Chief Judge Rader’s holistic, 
contextual, and comparative jurisprudence represents a valuable 
counterweight to the formalistic tendencies of the Federal Circuit. 
While the importance of ideational diversity is most closely 
associated with legislatures, courts, too, are deliberative bodies.97 
And in patent law, which does not have circuit splits, differences 
among individual Federal Circuit judges often serve to identify 
important issues for potential reevaluation and reform.98
 
 As such, 
the value of Chief Judge Rader’s commitment to context and 
realism may arise most centrally from the minority voice it 




While most of the contributions to this issue examine Chief 
Judge Rader’s jurisprudence in particular substantive fields, this 
Article takes a different approach. Rather than focus on a single 
substantive topic, it examines Chief Judge Rader’s methodological 
orientation across several doctrinal areas. The Federal Circuit has 
long been characterized as creating rule-based, context-eschewing, 
                                                                                                         
96 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in 
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989). 
97 See Hon. Paul Michel, Judicial Constellations: Guiding Principles as 
Navigational Aids, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 757, 763 (2004) (describing the 
“extensive memo traffic” and “enormously robust” debate that precedes the 
issuing of a Federal Circuit opinion). 
98 See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme 
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 318-19. 
21
Lee: Antiformalism at the Federal Circuit: The Jurisprudence of Chief
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
426 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:4 
formalistic doctrine. The jurisprudence of Chief Judge Rader, 
however, exhibits a valuable commitment to holism, realism, and 
context. In areas as diverse as claim construction, patentable 
subject matter, and the written description requirement, he 
demonstrates a refreshing embrace of policy-oriented, functional 
legal reasoning and an openness to engage academic scholarship 
and foreign patent law. Ironically, one of Chief Judge Rader’s most 
significant contributions to patent law arises from his status as a 
methodological contrarian of the court that he leads. 
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